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The Search for Clarity in
an Attorney’s Duty To Google
Michael Thomas Murphy*

Introduction
Attorneys have a professional duty to investigate relevant facts about
the matters on which they work. There is no specific rule or statute
requiring that an attorney perform an Internet search as part of this
investigation. Yet attorneys have been found by judges to violate what
commentators call a “Duty to Google”1 by failing to discover relevant
information about a matter, when that information was available through
the investigative use of an Internet search.2
This Duty to Google contemplates that certain readily available information on the public Internet about a legal matter is so easily accessible
that it must be discovered, collected, and examined by an attorney, or
else that attorney is acting unethically, committing malpractice, or both.
Discussion of an attorney’s Duty to Google is filtering into court opinions,
articles, and continuing legal education classes.3
* Michael Murphy, Clinical Supervisor and Lecturer at the Entrepreneurship Legal Clinic at the University of Pennsylvania
Carey Law School. In memory of my mother, Carol Murphy, who learned late in her life how to “check the Googles.” Thanks
to Alvin Dong, Paul Riermaier, and Yuqing Zheng for research assistance. Special thanks to Susan Brooks, Victoria Chase,
Anne Freedman, Rosemarie Griesmer, Sarah Katz, and Spencer Rand for their encouragement and feedback. Extra special
thanks to Beth Wilensky and Aliza Milner for being exceptional and patient editors. All mistakes are mine.
1 Megan Zavieh, Lawyers’ Duty to Google: Not Changing Anytime Soon, Att’y at Work (July 7, 2020), https://www.attorneyatwork.com/lawyers-duty-to-google/.
2 To “Google” a subject for inquiry on the Internet is a ubiquitous term. See Jeffrey Bellin & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,
Trial by Google: Judicial Notice in the Information Age, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1137, 1139 n.7 (2014) (“to use a search engine
such as Google to find information, a website address, etc., on the internet”) (quoting Google, Dictionary.com, http://
dictionary.reference.com/browse/google?s=) (last visited Mar. 11, 2021). This article generally uses the term “to Google” to
mean performing an Internet search using a search engine such as Google.
3 See, e.g., The Cybersleuth’s Guide to Fast, Free, and Effective Investigative Internet Research, King Cty. Bar Ass’n (No. 22,
2019), http://www.kcba.org/Portals/0/cle/pdf/!2019Cyber_Sleuths_Guide11222019.pdf. This CLE description stated,
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It is a strange and wonderful time to be alive. Using the Internet to
locate a fact is a commonplace activity for people with easy access to the
Internet. But it is also a fast and inexpensive way for an attorney undertaking a factual inquiry to obtain an immense amount of information in
a short time, and “[l]awyers, after all, are in the information business.”4
As Andrew Perlman concluded, “Simply put, lawyers cannot just stick
their heads in the sand when it comes to Internet investigations.”5 Such an
“ostrich-like” attorney would risk more than reputational embarrassment
and client dissatisfaction, as courts have issued sanctions for an attorney
who fails to Google pertinent information. Judges have reprimanded or
sanctioned attorneys in cases in which the attorney failed to conduct an
Internet search for relevant information about a matter, specifically about
their own client,6 a party,7 witness,8 or third party,9 and that failure either
caused harm or wasted the court’s time.10
Even though the Internet has been around for several decades now,
and even though courts have been imposing a Duty to Google for nearly
that long, there has been no real attempt to bring coherence to this
disjointed set of cases, and importantly, to define the breadth and depth
of what the Duty to Google should be. Where does this Duty arise? How
much electronic information must an attorney search to meet this Duty?
How does an attorney know when a technology has become so ubiquitous
In this fast-paced investigative research seminar, you will learn to create more effective Internet searches to
locate information crucial to your matters, which you might otherwise miss.
...
Don’t be left behind in exploiting this gold mine of information that will assist you in meeting your investigative
research and due diligence obligations. And, in addition to meeting your ethical duty, be conversant with the
benefits and risks of technology.
Id.
4 Jamie J. Baker, Beyond the Information Age: The Duty of Technology Competence in the Algorithmic Society, 69 S.C. L. Rev.
557, 570 (2018).
5 Andrew Perlman, The Twenty-First Century Lawyer’s Evolving Ethical Duty of Competence, 22 Prof. Law. 24, 28 (2014).
6 See, e.g., Cajamarca v. Regal Entm’t Grp., No. 11 Civ. 2780, 2012 WL 3782437, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2012) (explaining
that in discovery, attorney did not search client’s publicly available social media posts, which would have cast severe doubt
on her employment discrimination claims); In re Axam, 778 S.E.2d 222, 222 (Ga. 2015) (holding that attorney should have
verified transaction details before assisting in transaction).
7 Dubois v. Butler, 901 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (denouncing as insufficient attorney’s attempt to locate
missing defendant by calling directory assistance); Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 61 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (reasoning
that failure to Google absent defendant made attempted service void); Weatherly v. Optimum Asset Mgmt., Inc., 928 So. 2d
118, 122–23 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that tax sale notice was invalid where attorney failed to conduct an Internet search
for the address of the current owner, who lived out of state).
8 Cannedy v. Adams, No. ED CV 08-1230-CJC(E), 2009 WL 3711958, at *30 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (concluding that attorney’s
failure to search for an Internet message containing a purported molestation victim’s recantations was ineffective assistance
of counsel).
9 Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wright, 840 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Iowa 2013) (disciplining attorney for not
discovering that a deal that a client was considering was an obvious scam).
10 Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 598–99 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (suggesting that an attorney could waive objection
to a juror before trial if the attorney could have learned of the juror’s bias with an Internet search).
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that its use is compulsory to meet this Duty? This article explores these
questions and proposes a solution.
Section 1 of this article includes a discussion of what obligations
attorneys have under existing rules with respect to fact investigation and
examines the sources of the historical duty of fact investigation.
Section 2 discusses the emergence of Internet research as a logical
extension of an attorney’s duty of fact investigation. 11 In doing so, it
examines scenarios in legal practice where the Duty to Google has applied.
Section 3 examines the extent of the Duty to Google, in an attempt
to find some guidance for attorneys to meet this emerging professional
requirement. It suggests a codified Duty to Google as a specific addition
to the rules of professional conduct with respect to attorney competency.
It also explores how an emerging technology might become so ubiquitous
that it becomes part of an attorney’s investigation duty.
The article concludes with thoughts of the future, and how further
advances in technology may shape this duty in the years to come.

1. An attorney’s existing duty to investigate facts
The Duty to Google has its roots in an attorney’s duty to investigate
the facts surrounding their work. This duty to investigate is generally
considered to be an outgrowth of a rule of attorney competence in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter Model Rules),12 but can
also be found to some extent in effective assistance of counsel standards,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, malpractice statutes, and general
practice norms. This section discusses each of these sources in turn.
1.1. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
There is no flat directive or specificity that attorneys must use a
specific technology as part of their fact investigation. However, the cases
discussed in this article seem to suggest that such a directive exists. To
reach the conclusion that an attorney must use electronic search technology like Google to investigate certain facts, one must read together
portions of the commentary language in Model Rule 1.1, dealing with

11 See Agnieszka McPeak, Social Media Snooping and its Ethical Bounds, 46 Ariz. St. L.J. 845, 862 (2014) (reviewing cases
and concluding that “legal ethics rules impose a duty on lawyers to use reasonable efforts to investigate facts and to avoid
frivolous claims, even with computer-aided legal and factual research”).
12 Model R. Prof’l Conduct 1.1 cmt. 5 (Am. Bar. Ass’n 2020). Of course, the Model Rules do not in and of themselves
have legal effect—states must adopt them, and often do, but not word-for-word. For a breakdown of the adoption of this
change to the Model Rules, see John G. Browning, The New Duty of Digital Competence: Being Ethical and Competent in the
Age of Facebook and Twitter, 44 U. Dayton L. Rev. 179, 180–84 (2019).
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attorney competence.13 This rule states, “A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation.”14
Two comments in the rule work together to outline how a duty to
investigate can be affected by technology. In comment 5, the rule explains
that competent representation includes “inquiry into and analysis of the
factual and legal elements of the problem and the use of methods and
procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners.”15 Lori
Johnson notes, “Existing comments to Rule 1.1 indicate that competence
is considered on a case-by-case basis, in a somewhat subjective manner.
Specifically, comment 1 to Rule 1.1 indicates that competence is keyed to
the ‘nature of the matter’ and ‘the lawyer’s training and experience in the
field.’”16 Comment 8 makes clear that this competency includes technological proficiency, not just rote use.17 It clarifies Rule 1.1 to mean that
a lawyer must stay abreast of “relevant technology.”18 As of this writing,
thirty-eight states have adopted that rule in some way.19 (Though as Mark
Britton noted, this adoption is slow and incomplete.20) Florida and North
Carolina now require attorneys to take yearly technology continuing legal
education classes in the same way most states require yearly ethics or
mental health CLE classes.21

13 See, e.g., Perlman, supra note 5, at 24 (“Lawyers no longer need to rely exclusively on private investigators to uncover a
wealth of factual information about a legal matter. Lawyers can learn a great deal from simple Internet searches. Lawyers
ignore this competency at their peril.”).
14 Model R. Prof’l Conduct 1.1.
15 Id. cmt. 5.
16 See Lori D. Johnson, Navigating Technology Competence in Transactional Practice, 65 Vill. L. Rev. 159, 165–66 (2020).
17 Browning, supra note 12, at 196–97 (discussing failures of attorneys to use technology and concluding that attorneys
must be “knowledgeable of both the benefits and the risks of the technology that is out there, including the functionality of
the technology they are actually using (or, in some cases, should be using)”).
18 Model R. Prof’l Conduct 1.1 cmt. 8.
19 Johnson, supra note 16, at 166 (discussing comment 8). “As Rule 1.1 clearly focuses on the ‘client’ and ‘representation,’
guidance surrounding Comment 8 must do the same, and lawyers should be required to become and remain competent in
any technology used by, or beneficial to, their clients.” Id. at 163.
20 See Mark Britton, Behind Stables and Saloons: The Legal Profession’s Race to the Back of the Technological Pack, Fla. B.J.,
Jan. 2016, at 34 (noting that the slow adoption is further evidence that “[l]awyers lag behind their clients (the general population) and even other professions in adopting new technology”).
21 See Heidi Frostestad Kuehl, Technologically Competent: Ethical Practice for 21st Century Lawyering, 10 Case W. Res. J.L.
Tech. & Internet 1, 26 n.177 (citing Bob Ambrogi, North Carolina Becomes Second State to Mandate Technology Training
for Lawyers, LawSites (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2018/12/north-carolina-becomes-second-statemandate-technology-training-lawyers.html#:~:text=North%20Carolina%20has%20become%20the,CLE%20devoted%20
to%20technology%20training).
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1.2. Effective assistance of counsel standards
An attorney’s duty to investigate matters has evolved in an instructive
way in the capital criminal defense context. 22 A long progression of
cases exists interpreting whether an attorney’s investigation in a capital
case violates the American Bar Association’s standards for ineffective
assistance of counsel, a standard that has been adopted by many courts.23
In a 1984 case, Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court cited the
ABA standards and noted that “counsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary.”24 Subsequently, the issue of adequate investigation by defense counsel in capital cases has received attention in
scholarship and by courts.25 That attention expanded outside of capital
cases and into other criminal cases. Today, the ABA standards with
respect to criminal investigation include a specific description of a defense
attorney’s duty to investigate. ABA Standard 4-4.1 (“Duty to Investigate
and Engage Investigators”) provides that criminal defense attorneys have
a duty to investigate the sufficiency of the factual basis for the criminal
charges their clients face.26 One court noted, “An attorney’s performance
is deficient when he or she fails to conduct any investigation into exculpatory evidence and has not provided any explanation for not doing so.”27
In a later case, the Supreme Court interpreted the ABA standards
and guidelines to include a reasonability requirement, stating, “The ABA
Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating evidence ‘should
comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence
and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced
by the prosecutor.’”28 Notably, the ABA standards and guidelines became
more specific over time and as courts interpreted them as a standard

22 See John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, It’s Like Deja Vu All Over Again: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla
v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 Am. J. Crim. L. 127, 132
(2007) (noting that the duty to investigate is “the most heavily scrutinized aspect of defense counsel’s representation” in ineffective assistance of counsel cases).
23 See Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and the Test for Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, 35 Pepp. L. Rev. 77 (2007); see also Emily Olson-Gault, Reclaiming Van Hook: Using the ABA’s Guidelines and
Resources to Establish Prevailing Professional Norms, 46 Hofstra L. Rev. 1279, 1279 (2018) (noting that the guidelines
“have been cited favorably by courts in more than 350 reported opinions, adopted in substantive part by at least ten capital
jurisdictions”).
24 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
25 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer,
103 Yale L.J. 1835 (1994) (collecting cases showing widespread inadequate investigation by criminal defense counsel in
capital cases); Rigg, supra note 23, at 88–93 (describing a series of cases in the early 2000s).
26 ABA, Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function, Am. Bar Ass’n Standard 4-4.1, https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition/ (last visited May 12, 2021).
27 See Rigg, supra note 23, at 90 n.95 (quoting Stevens v. Del. Corr. Ctr., 152 F. Supp. 2d 561, 576–77 (D. Del. 2001)).
28 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003); see also Rigg, supra note 23, at 91 n.105.
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for the reasonableness of an investigation.29 Courts then used the ABA’s
guidance to help determine and define the “‘prevailing professional norms’
in ineffective assistance cases.”30 Later cases have noted that courts must
examine an investigation, in particular a decision not to investigate, for
“reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of
deference to counsel’s judgments.”31
This language is certainly helpful for attorneys looking to better
understand their factual investigation obligations, but it is of course
limited to the specific context of criminal cases. It can be instructive in
determining an overall Duty to Google, as explored in section 2.
1.3. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The duty to investigate may be found in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, at Rule 11. Rule 11 requires that an attorney make a reasonable
inquiry to determine that the arguments in a filed document are not
frivolous.32 Therefore, it seems that at least a cursory factual investigation
such as an Internet search is required for an attorney to adequately make
the good faith assertion that a filing is not being advanced for an improper
purpose. Per the rule, the attorney must make a “reasonable inquiry”
to build information and belief of proper purpose. This language and
directive is helpful, but limited in context to litigation.
1.4. Malpractice or agency law
George Cohen notes that “other law may impose on lawyers a duty to
investigate,” citing malpractice law and agency law.33 Cohen observes that
these sources of a duty to investigate generally come from the Model Rules
or Rule 11.34 That is so because these sources arise as part of a negligence
claim based on an attorney acting as a fiduciary to the client, which carries
with it a duty of competent representation.35 It is likely, then, that a charge of
malpractice for the violation of the duty to investigate would be in addition
to, not instead of, a violation of a rule of professional conduct or Rule 11.
29 See Rigg, supra note 23, at 93 (“Later, and current, ABA Guidelines relating to death penalty defense are even more
explicit.”).
30 See id. at 95 (citing Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2003)).
31 See id. at 96–97 (citing In re Lucas, 94 P.3d 477, 502 (Cal. 2004)).
32 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
33 See George M. Cohen, The State of Lawyer Knowledge Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 3 Am. U. Bus. L.
Rev. 115, 128 (2014) (citing Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 52 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 2000) and
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.11(1) (Am. Law Inst. 2006)).
34 See id. at 129.
35 See Ellie Margolis, Surfin’ Safari—Why Competent Lawyers Should Research on the Web, 10 Yale J.L. & Tech. 82, 103
(2008).
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2. The curious appearance of the Duty to Google
Enter Google and other easily accessible means of obtaining information, which lower the cost of an attorney’s investigation efforts to such
a degree that their use is, to an extent, required. A series of unrelated
cases has emerged over the last decade where courts have admonished or
sanctioned an attorney for that attorney’s failure to use electronic search
technology as part of that attorney’s duty to investigate a matter. These
sanctions can be monetary, in the form of refunded client fees and other
damages based on the error, or can take the form of prescribing attorney
training or a certification that Internet research will be part of future
conduct. The latter sanctions are a public reprimand, a “benchslap”36 that
creates bad press in an industry that relies on reputation.37
It is clear from the cases below that today’s attorney has a duty to use
technology—for the purposes of this article, “Googling” or another public
Internet search—to investigate key aspects of a matter such as their client,
adversary, facts, and even potential jurors. These cases show that a savvy
attorney satisfying their Duty to Google should at least consider using
the Internet to research social media evidence, the location of missing
witnesses or parties, verifiable facts in dispute, and even the attorney’s
own client.
2.1. The Duty to Google missing witnesses and parties
One of the first and perhaps the most obvious instances in which the
Duty to Google arises is one in which the attorney must locate a person,
for service or other participation in a legal proceeding. For example, in
Munster v. Groce,38 the Court of Appeals of Indiana questioned the plaintiff ’s efforts to effectuate service on a missing individual defendant. The
court found the plaintiff ’s efforts to be insufficient because the plaintiff ’s
attorney did not run a skip trace, a public records search, or an Internet
search.39 Worse still, the court itself performed a search and found that it

36 This term is colloquial, and refers to an admonishment from the bench to a misbehaving counsel (or litigant). See Heidi K.
Brown, Converting Benchslaps to Backslaps: Instilling Professional Accountability in New Legal Writers by Teaching and Reinforcing Context, 11 Legal Comm. & Rhetoric 109, 109 (2014); Dwight H. Sullivan & Eugene R. Fidell, Winding (Back) the
Crazy Clock: The Origins of a Benchslap, 19 Green Bag 2d 397, 397 n.1 (2016) (“‘Benchslap’ made its Black’s Law Dictionary
debut in the 10th edition, defined as: ‘A judge’s sharp rebuke of counsel, a litigant, or perhaps another judge; esp., a scathing
remark from a judge or magistrate to an attorney after an objection from opposing counsel has been sustained.’”).
37 Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 173, 176–83 (2008).
38 Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
39 Id. at n.3.
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would be easy for an attorney to find an address for the defendant, and the
names of family members who may have known his whereabouts.40
In a similar case in Florida, Dubois v. Butler,41 the plaintiff searching
for a missing defendant checked directory assistance looking for an
address to serve a defendant—and nothing more. The standard for
whether such an effort is sufficient is, in the court’s words, whether the
plaintiff failed to follow an “obvious” lead or available resource.42 The
court found that an Internet search was an “obvious” avenue that the
plaintiff ignored.43 In taking issue with the plaintiff ’s sole call to directory
assistance, the court cheekily stated that “advances in modern technology and the widespread use of the Internet have sent the investigative
technique of a call to directory assistance the way of the horse and buggy
and the eight track stereo.”44
In Weatherly v. Optimum Asset Management, Inc.,45 a Louisiana trial
court considered whether a party was “reasonably identifiable” for the
purposes of requiring actual service of a tax sale. The defendant argued
that the plaintiff was not “reasonably identifiable” because the defendant
did not have basic contact information for the plaintiff.46 The trial court
performed its own Internet search for plaintiff and, based on its results,
found that the plaintiff was “reasonably identifiable.”47 The appeals court
questioned the ability of the judge to take judicial notice of its own
Internet search, but noted that plaintiff nevertheless did not perform a
sufficient search.48
Relatedly, an attorney has a Duty to Google a client the attorney
cannot locate. A New Jersey appeals court found that an attorney could
not withdraw representation from an absent client where she did not
make diligent efforts to locate the client, including an Internet search. 49
The Alaska Bar Association issued an ethics opinion stating that attorneys
40 Id. Specifically, the court wrote,
We do note that there is no evidence in this case of a public records or internet search for Groce . . . . In fact, we
discovered, upon entering “Joe Groce Indiana” into the Google search engine, an address for Groce that differed
from either address used in this case, as well as an apparent obituary for Groce’s mother that listed numerous
surviving relatives who might have known his whereabouts.
Id.
41 Dubois v. Butler, 901 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
42 Id. at 1030.
43 Id. at 1031.
44 Id.
45 Weatherly v. Optimum Asset Mgmt., Inc., 928 So. 2d 118, 121 23 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 122–23.
49 Garrett v. Matisa, 927 A.2d 177, 182 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2007).
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representing a client in a criminal appeal, where the client cannot be
contacted,50 must make “reasonable efforts” to contact the client, which
specifically include an Internet search.51
The Duty to Google should certainly exist where attorneys seek to
show that they performed a diligent search for the location of witnesses
or absent parties.52 As a cautionary tale, Michael Whiteman notes that in
one Pennsylvania case, a court found that a Google search by itself did
not suffice as a reasonable search, when that Google search did not reveal
the contact information for a missing party. 53 Therefore, a Google search
would need to be performed in addition to, not instead of, searching for a
party by conventional means (for example, in a phonebook).
It makes sense that an attorney would need to use any readily available
technology when searching for a participant in a suit, particularly since this
duty is so closely tied to the attorney’s duty of candor to the tribunal. The
extent of that search, of course, should be reasonable to the importance of
the party or witness to the case, and the resources at hand.
2.2. The Duty to Google verifiable disputed facts in litigation
An attorney also has a Duty to Google facts in dispute in litigation.
In Cannedy v. Adams, 54 a California court considered an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in a molestation case against a stepfather
accused of molesting his stepdaughter. 55 The stepfather argued that,
against his urging, his attorney failed to investigate a friend of the victim,
who would have testified that she saw exculpating evidence (essentially,
that the victim fabricated her allegations) on the victim’s social media
page, specifically an AOL Instant Messenger profile.56 The court found
the failure to follow up with this witness to be ineffective assistance of
counsel.57 In attempting to ascertain why the stepfather’s attorney failed to
contact this witness, the court surmised that the attorney may have lacked
the technological knowledge and skill to appreciate the value of this information and to obtain it.58 The court concluded that the attorney may have

50 Perhaps a somewhat common problem on the last frontier.
51 Alaska Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 2011-4, at 1 (2011).
52 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
53 Michael Whiteman, The Death of Twentieth-Century Authority, 58 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 27, 43 (2010) (citing
Fernandez v. Tax Claim Bureau of Northampton Cty., 925 A.2d 207 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007)).
54 2009 WL 3711958 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2009).
55 Id. at *28.
56 Id. at *16.
57 Id. at *29.
58 Id. at *34 n.19.
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“misunderstood the workings of AOL Instant Messenger in ways that
caused him to depreciate the value of the information.”59 It is interesting
to note here that the stepfather’s attorney was held to the ineffective
assistance of counsel standard—one in which the attorney’s conduct
falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness”60—not because the
attorney did not use certain technology but because the attorney lacked
the technical knowledge to use it proficiently. This case provides an
example of the idea discussed in section 1 that technological proficiency,
not just use, comprises the Duty to Google. So the Duty to Google really
is one of technological competence, where an attorney must have both
a breadth and a depth of knowledge of electronic information resources.
An attorney must know where to look, locating relevant electronic information resources, but then also how to find relevant information from
each resource. These resources change constantly with the winds and
whims of usage. Today’s Facebook may end up being tomorrow’s MySpace.
On that note, the Duty to Google facts has extended into searching
social media. As one commentator noted, “In light of the amount of time
Americans spend online, and the ease with which users freely share information with others, it follows that lawyers should utilize social media to
research and investigate cases on behalf of their clients.”61 In Lorraine
v. Markel American Insurance Co.,62 Judge Paul Grimm considered the
admissibility of social media evidence, and in an oft-cited opinion noted,
“[I]t is not surprising that many statements involving observations of
events surrounding us, statements regarding how we feel, our plans
and motives, and our feelings (emotional and physical) will be communicated in electronic medium.” In other words, social media evidence can
be among the most important evidence in a case, and is generally only
available through an electronic search and often the use of the social
media platform.63 Discovering that evidence is thus a part of a lawyer’s
duty of competent representation.64
Using the Internet to investigate verifiable facts in dispute in litigation
also seems commonsensical. It certainly should be required by attorneys
at the beginning of a case as part of their ethical duty to verify the facts

59 Id.
60 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
61 Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, “Why Can’t We Be ‘Friends’?”: Ethical Concerns in the Use of Social Media, 57 S. Tex. L. Rev.
551, 552 (2016).
62 241 F.R.D. 534, 569 (D. Md. 2007).
63 McPeak, supra note 11, at 877.
64 Id. at 880 (“Although lawyers should, as a matter of professional competence, search social media in informal discovery,
they must also be aware of the ethical limitations of doing so.”).
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asserted in legal pleadings. The extent of an attorney’s duty to investigate
the facts of a claim has been discussed by the ABA as depending on any
number of factors:
the complexity or nature of the claims or contentions to be investigated
or developed, the time in which the investigation must be conducted, the
resources available to the lawyer to conduct the investigation, the availability and cooperation of potential fact and expert witnesses, whether
expert witnesses must be consulted, the availability of evidence that can
be obtained without formal discovery, whether any investigation has
been conducted prior to the lawyer undertaking the representation, the
existence of parallel proceedings that complicate or expedite matters,
and probably more.65

Internet searches fit into these factors in a number of ways. For one,
a basic Internet search should be a resource available to almost every
attorney, and should be able to be performed in little time. Therefore, the
extent of the search rests on the nature and complexity of the claims. In
a complex case with expert testimony and many “moving parts,” it may
be prudent for an attorney to use an investigator or research service to
conduct an extremely comprehensive search.66 These methods may be
outside of an attorney’s knowledge, but if the attorney’s investigation
warrants such methods, the attorney has a duty to contract with professionals who can capably perform the search.67
Also, the Duty to Google exists for both parties as part of their
responsibility to cooperate in discovery, if only because parties are
strongly encouraged to eliminate disputes over facts and stipulate to
facts.68 Using Internet technology to narrow the facts of a case by finding
objective, verifiable information to which parties can stipulate will be a
welcome development for courts and clients. It is said that parties should

65 Douglas R. Richmond, Brian Shannon Faughnan & Michael L. Matula, Professional Responsibility in
Litigation 4 (2016).
66 A new profession has emerged of “digital private investigators,” who specialize in using Internet searches and databases
to collect information. See, e.g., Digital Private Investigators and Family Law, Fournier Law Firm Blog (May 29, 2016),
http://fournierlawoffice.com/blog/digital-private-investigators-and-family-law/.
67 This duty is explicit in an attorney’s duty of technological competence. See, e.g., Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof ’l
Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 2015-193, at 3 (2015) (noting that to satisfy an attorney’s duty of technological
competence the attorney “must try to acquire sufficient learning or skill, or associate or consult with someone with the
necessary expertise to assist”).
68 See generally William Matthewman, Towards a New Paradigm for E-Discovery in Civil Litigation: A Judicial Perspective,
71 Fla. L. Rev. 1261 (2019) (discussing changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure designed to increase cooperation
among opposing parties in discovery).
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ask judges to take judicial notice of facts more often.69 The Duty to Google
can be a key tool in that trend.70
2.3. The Duty to Google clients
An attorney has a Duty to Google their own client, particularly to
verify the facts represented to the attorney by their client. 71 Joel Cohen
investigated examples of this phenomenon:
Must lawyers “Google” their (prospective) clients to learn “who” they’re
dealing with—meaning how reliable they’re likely to be? Shouldn’t
lawyers research their clients’ claims by not only looking at the information provided by the client, but by making sure it makes sense; that
documents fit with the client’s story and other information received? The
rules seem to require it.72

The ABA noted that an attorney presenting false information to a
tribunal runs afoul of Model Rule 3.3, “Candor Toward the Tribunal,”73
and that “it is reasonable to note that pressure is mounting from the
government to increase private lawyers’ obligation of due diligence in
representation of clients as to financial transactions.”74 This duty is maybe
most obvious when an attorney is engaged in issuing an opinion, such
as an opinion letter providing advice on a proposed merger or tax obligation.75 George Cohen notes that “[l]egal duties of inquiry imposed are
perhaps most developed for securities lawyers,” particularly with respect
to the issuance of materials to investors. 76 This duty would be tied very
directly to the duty of competence—an attorney who provides an opinion
letter based on unverified facts is gambling, at least.
69 Judicial notice allows a court to accept a proposition without presented evidence of that proposition’s veracity. See Fed. R.
Evid. 201; Paul J. Kiernan, Better Living Through Judicial Notice, 36 Litig., Fall 2009, at 42–43, 45.
70 See Bellin & Ferguson, supra note 2, at 1137, 1141 n.18 (quoting Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging,
141–42 (2013) (“The Internet is not going away. The quality and quantity of online material that illuminates the issues in
federal litigation will only grow. Judges must not ignore such a rich mine of information.”)).
71 See Joel Cohen, The Lawyer’s Duty to Check Facts, N.Y. L. J. (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.stroock.com/uploads/newyorklawjournal.pdf.
72 Id. at *5. For example, George Cohen notes that the ABA issued an opinion on “Client Due Diligence, Money Laundering,
and Terrorist Financing” in which it stated, “‘It would be prudent for lawyers to undertake Client Due Diligence (“CDD”) in
appropriate circumstances to avoid facilitating illegal activity or being drawn unwittingly into a criminal activity.’” Cohen,
supra note 33, at 126 (quoting ABA Comm. on Prof ’1 Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 13-463 (2013)). He explains further
that lawyers must “determine a non-frivolous basis in fact and law for bringing or defending against a civil claim.” Id. at 127.
73 Model R. Prof’l Conduct 3.3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2020). Section 3.3(a)(3) states, “A lawyer shall not knowingly offer
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.” Id.
74 Dennis A. Rendleman, What to Do When Your Client Lies, ABA Ethics in View (Sept. 2019), https://www.americanbar.
org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2019/september-2019/what-to-do-when-your-client-lies/.
75 See Cohen, supra note 33, at 129.
76 Id.
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It is clear that attorneys should do something more than operate on
faith that the client is telling the truth about who they say they are and
what they are doing.77 Vendors now market “people search” solutions to
attorneys to accomplish this goal.78
One such case in which a “people search” would have been most
useful is Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Wright.79
There, an attorney learned from a client that the client stood to inherent
a large sum of money from a long-lost relative in Nigeria, such sum to
be released once the client paid an outstanding tax debt to the Nigerian
government. 80 The attorney agreed to represent the client for a ten
percent commission on the recovered funds.81 The attorney then reached
out to other clients and arranged for those clients to lend money so that
the Nigerian tax debt could be paid.82 The attorney then facilitated the
repayment of the Nigerian tax debt.83 Most readers of this article sadly
shaking their heads reading this paragraph already know what the
attorney in Wright did not; the “business deal” was actually a classic
Internet scam referred to as the “Nigerian Prince” scam.84 The client and
attorney received no money, and the other clients who lent money were
never repaid.85 The attorney’s license to practice law was suspended for a
year.86 In suspending it, the Iowa Supreme Court noted (somewhat charitably) that the “evidence in this case established that a cursory internet

77 See Richmond et al., supra note 65, at 4 (“[L]lawyers must conduct some type of preliminary investigation into clients’
intended claims and contentions.”).
78 Jeremy Byellin, Investigate Your Potential Client? It’s More Important Than You Think, Thomson Reuters Practice
of Law Blog (July 14, 2016), http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/practice-of-law/investigate-your-own-clientits-more-important-than-you-may-think/ (describing the importance of an attorney conducting due diligence via Internet
search on potential clients and marketing “PeopleMap”).
79 Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wright, 840 N.W.2d 295, 301–04 (Iowa 2013).
80 Id. at 297.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 301. The “Nigerian Prince” scam has been known since the 1990s and has made its way into popular culture on
television shows such as “30 Rock” and “The Office.” See Finn Brunton, The Long, Weird History of the Nigerian E-mail Scam,
Bos. Globe (May 19, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/05/18/the-long-weird-history-nigerian-mail-scam/
C8bIhwQSVoygYtrlxsJTlJ/story.html (“The deal is this: You make a small initial outlay (the advance fee), in exchange for an
enormous return. But once you take the bait, things inevitably begin to go wrong. The customs staff changes, new bribes are
needed, a key person in the transaction falls ill. Just a little more money, the writer promises, and you’ll make it all back.”).
It is a version of the “advance fee” scam, which has its roots at least as far back as the “Spanish Prisoner” scams of the nineteenth century. Id. In that scam, a Spanish soldier concealed money while fighting in the Spanish-American war, only to be
tragically and inconveniently imprisoned in Spain, needing an American to recover it. Id. This scam is still in use today. See
Megan Leonhardt, ‘Nigerian Prince’ Email Scams Still Rake in Over $700,000 a Year—Here’s How to Protect Yourself, CNBC.
com (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/18/nigerian-prince-scams-still-rake-in-over-700000-dollars-a-year.
html.
85 Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wright, 840 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Iowa 2013).
86 Id. at 304.
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search . . . would have revealed evidence that [the client’s] dream of a
Nigerian inheritance was probably based on a scam.”87 The court further
observed that “‘Wright appears to have honestly believed—and continues
to believe—that one day a trunk full of . . . one hundred dollar bills is going
to appear upon his office doorstep,’” and that other attorneys had fallen for
the same ruse.88
The Wright case’s Nigerian prince taught an attorney a lesson that
all transactional attorneys should heed—the Duty to Google certainly
extends into the transactional side of practice. A transactional attorney
should, for example, Google all sides of a negotiation for a proposed transaction, especially if one or more of those sides is an unfamiliar entity.
Indeed, the Duty to Google can and should extend to material representations made during negotiations, to the extent such representations are
reasonably verifiable through an Internet search.
In another example, a high-profile attorney in Georgia, Tony Axam,
voluntarily surrendered his license after an ethics investigation showed
that he failed to take any steps to verify information about a transaction in
a matter and thus facilitated illegal activity.89
The Duty to Google facts about one’s client has extended to social
media information, at least to the extent such information is available to
the attorney.90 For example, in Cajamarca v. Regal Entertainment Group,
a sexual harassment case, readily available social media evidence revealed
that the plaintiff, rather than being severely incapacitated as a result of
the incidents of harassment, engaged in “an extraordinarily active travel
and social life.”91 In sanctioning the plaintiff ’s attorney under Rule 11,
relating to an attorney’s duty to avoid frivolous filings, 92 the court stated

87 Id. at 301.
88 Id. at 300.
89 In re Axam, 778 S.E.2d 222, 222 (Ga. 2015). Specifically, Mr. Axam agreed to act as a “paymaster” for a client and
distribute funds for the client, taking a commission as payment. Id. Mr. Axam received a wire transfer from an individual
connected to his client and deposited that money into his firm operating account. Id. Axam admitted that he did not read
the terms of the trading platform contract in connection with which he was serving as “paymaster,” that he did not know the
nature of the business dealings between his client and the other individual, and that he asked no questions about the transaction that he facilitated. Id.
90 See Peter Segrist, How the Rise of Big Data and Predictive Analytics Are Changing the Attorney’s Duty of Competence,
16 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 527, 605 (2015) (“It has also been suggested that there is an affirmative obligation for attorneys to
inquire into social networking information that may hold potential relevance in a given matter.”).
91 Cajamarca v. Regal Entm’t Grp., No. 11 Civ. 2780, 2012 WL 3782437, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2012).
92 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 provides in relevant part,
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting,
or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
...
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.
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that “plaintiff ’s lawyer should be roundly embarrassed. At the very least,
he did an extraordinarily poor job of client intake in not learning highly
material information about his client.”93 Margaret DiBianca concluded,
“Naysayers and late adopters alike may be equally surprised to learn that
ignoring social media altogether may constitute a violation of their ethical
obligations.”94
2.4. The Duty to Google jurors
An attorney trying a case may have a Duty to Google jurors. This
specific area of law is developed but still somewhat unsettled. 95 The
genesis of this duty is in an attorney’s ability to conduct due diligence on
jurors “in order to ascertain whether the juror has any bias, opinion, or
prejudice that would affect or control the fair determination by him of
the issues to be tried.”96 The ease of Internet research, obviously, makes
this due diligence common, if perhaps imprecise. “Googling” jurors
is now common.97 One article quotes a state judge in Florida as having
an “unspoken expectation” that attorneys will research jurors before
and during a case, because such research is part of an attorney’s duty of
competence.98
One case illustrates the complexity of this practice. In Johnson v.
McCullough,99 an attorney on appeal in a medical malpractice case argued
that a juror in the trial court had lied during voir dire, when asked if he had
ever been a party to a lawsuit.100 The attorney discovered this falsehood
by searching for the juror on Missouri’s automated court record system,
For an excellent summary of Rule 11, see Julia K. Cowles, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Duty to
Withdraw a Baseless Pleading, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 697 (1988).
93 Cajamarca, 2012 WL 3782437, at *2; see also Donna Bader, Have You Googled Your Clients Lately?, An Appeal to
Reason (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.anappealtoreason.com/home/2012/9/11/have-you-googled-your-clients-lately.html.
An additional complexity is that the user of a social media account controls the privacy settings, and the account may not
be available to an attorney without the attorney “friending” the user, which may raise ethical concerns. See Pa. Bar Ass’n,
Formal Op. 2014-300, at 7–8 (2014) (stating that attorneys may connect with clients and former clients, but not represented
persons); see also infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text.
94 Margaret M. DiBianca, Ethical Risks Arising from Lawyers’ Use of (and Refusal to Use) Social Media, 12 Del. L. Rev. 179,
182 (2011).
95 See J.C. Lundberg, Googling Jurors to Conduct Voir Dire, 8 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 123 (2012). Lundberg notes, “The
growing efficacy of the Internet as a tool for conducting jury research has far outpaced the development of guidelines for its
use, leaving Internet-based jury research in an ambiguous position.” Id. at 125.
96 Id. at 130 (quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991)).
97 See John G. Browning, Voir Dire Becomes Voir Google: Ethical Concerns of 21st Century Jury Selection, The Brief (Apr.
25, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/tort_trial_insurance_practice/publications/the_brief/2016_17/winter/voir_
dire_becomes_voir_google_ethical_concerns_of_21st_century_jury_selection/.
98 Ben Hancock, Should You ‘Facebook’ the Jury? Yes. No. Probably, The Recorder (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.therecorder.
com/id=1202784626601/Should-You-Facebook-the-Jury-Yes-No-Probably.
99 306 S.W.3d 551, 598–99 (Mo. 2010) (en banc).
100 Id. at 554.
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Case.net.101 The Court bristled at the idea of attorneys searching for juror
information after a case to undermine a verdict, and directed attorneys to
affirmatively search for information about jurors on Case.net before trial.
As one observer noted, attorneys “now have a free and potentially easy
means to search a prospective juror’s litigation experience.”102 Attorneys
who fail to perform such a search risk waiving the ability to argue juror
nondisclosure in voir dire on appeal.103 That is to say that attorneys are not
just permitted to Google jurors. They may be required to Google jurors to
preserve a right on appeal.104
Johnson was not the only case in which a judge noted that an
attorney’s failure to discover juror bias during voir dire was the result
of an insufficient investigation using electronic search technology. 105
The ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a formal opinion stating that it is acceptable for attorneys to
research prospective jurors on the Internet and/or through social media,
provided that the attorneys do not make any sort of “active” contact with
the targets of their research, such as “friending” or “following” them (and
as long as such research is not prohibited by law or court order).106 There,
the ABA noted in a footnote,
While this Committee does not take a position on whether the standard
of care for competent lawyer performance requires using Internet
research to locate information about jurors that is relevant to the jury
selection process, we are also mindful . . . that a lawyer “should keep
abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and
risks associated with relevant technology.”107

The bar associations of New York, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania
have issued similar opinions, though these opinions do not so much
establish a bright-line rule as they analogize jurors to opposing parties
101 Id. at 555.
102 John Constance, Note, Attorney Duty to Search Case.net for Juror Nondisclosure: Missouri Supreme Court Rule 69.025,
76 Mo. L. Rev. 493, 494 (2010).
103 See Johnson, 306 S.W.3d at 559.
104 Lundberg, supra note 95, at 132. Requiring attorneys to investigate jurors using electronic sources such as social media
carries with it an additional responsibility. Attorneys must be aware of the ethical constraints of investigation and contact
with unrepresented parties. These constraints, of course, are evolving. See, e.g., Browning, supra note 97.
105 For example, in a personal injury case, attorneys for a defendant discovered after a trial that jurors had misrepresented
prior involvement in litigation, and used that misrepresentation as a basis for appeal. Burden v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 08–
cv–04–DRH, 2011 WL 3793664, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2011). The court rejected this argument and stated that the attorney
should have discovered that information during voir dire, and that such Internet searches constitute “reasonable diligence.”
Id.
106 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 14-466 (2014).
107 Id. at 2 n.3 (quoting Model R. Prof’l Conduct 1.1 cmt. 8).
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with respect to the permissiveness of contact.108 A district judge in the
Eastern District of Texas has issued a standing order providing guidelines
for the Internet research of jurors, prohibiting active communication such
as “friending” but allowing for passive communication such as profile
viewing, noting that in so doing, “The Court recognizes the duty imposed
on diligent parties to secure as much useful information as possible about
venire members.”109
In the closest formal rule with respect to a Duty to Google to date,
shortly after the Johnson decision, in 2010, the Missouri Supreme Court
adopted Rule 69.025, which addresses juror nondisclosure.110 It states in
relevant part,
(b) Reasonable Investigation. For purposes of this Rule 69.025, a
“reasonable investigation” means review of Case.net before the jury is
sworn.
...
(e) Waiver. A party waives the right to seek relief based on juror nondisclosure of information that would be readily apparent from a reasonable
investigation unless the party does the following before the jury is sworn:
(1) Conduct a reasonable investigation.

But this rule by no means settled the issue. In a later opinion in King
v. Sorensen,111 the Missouri Supreme Court stated, “While Rule 69.025(b)
specifically requires Case.net searches of prospective jurors, it neither
specifies the extent of an attorney’s research obligation nor instructs how
searches are to be conducted.”112 This was an issue in that particular case
because an attorney’s search for information about a juror was deemed
by a lower court to be insufficient, but the court provided the attorney
with the incorrect name of the juror. At issue was whether the attorney
had a duty to search variants of the juror’s name.113 In concluding that
the attorney’s reliance on the court was reasonable, the Court in King
observed, “No Missouri court has addressed the issue of what type of
108 See N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2012-13/05, at 2 (2012) (stating an attorney’s “general duty to be aware
of social media as a source of potentially useful information in litigation, to be competent to obtain that information directly
or through an agent”); N.Y. Cty. Lawyers Ass’n Comm. on Prof ’l Ethics, Formal Op. 743 (2011); Pa. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op.
2014-300 (2014).
109 U.S. District Judge Rodney Gilstrap, Standing Order Regarding Research as to Potential Jurors in All Cases Assigned
to U.S. District Judge Rodney Gilstrap, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Eastern Dist. of Tex. 2 (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.txed.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judgeFiles/Standing%20Order%20--%20Juror%20Research%20%28signed%29.pdf.
110 Mo. R. Civ. P. 69.025.
111 532 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
112 Id. at 215.
113 Id. at 212.
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‘review of Case.net’ will be deemed ‘reasonable investigation’ with regard
to Rule 69.025.”114
Subsequently, Missouri appellate courts have noted that the standard
for researching jurors on the Internet is not one of perfection and
omniscience, stating that it cannot be the rule that “any and all research—
Internet based or otherwise—into a juror’s alleged material nondisclosure
must be performed and brought to the attention of the trial court before
the jury is empaneled or the complaining party waives the right to seek
relief from the trial court.”115 Instead, Missouri courts seem in agreement
with the rather nebulous rule
that the day may come that technological advances may compel our
Supreme Court to re-think the scope of required “reasonable investigation” into the background of jurors that may impact challenges to the
veracity of responses given in voir dire before the jury is empanelled—
[but] that day has not arrived as of yet.116

That conclusion does not inspire confidence in the current state of
guidance with respect to a Duty to Google. While the ABA may not be
imposing an affirmative obligation, the difficulties attorneys have faced in
cases such as Johnson suggest that an attorney’s obligation is more than a
wise choice—it seems like a requirement.117
As noted above, there is a growing body of law with respect to the
appropriateness of Googling jurors in voir dire. 118 Proponents of the
practice argue that a juror’s online presence is unable to misrepresent bias
the way a juror can while under pressure of questioning in open court,
while opponents of the practice note that it is tantamount to opening the
voir dire process beyond questioning under oath and raises a host of reliability issues.119 This is one of the few areas to date in which Rule 1.1 has
114 Id. at 215.
115 Khoury v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 189, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
116 Id. at 203.
117 See Browning, supra note 97 (“Researching the social media activity of prospective jurors, and continuing to monitor
social media activity during trial, can be vital to seating an honest, unbiased jury and to ensuring that any online misconduct
is promptly brought to the court’s attention.”).
118 See, e.g., Patrick Schweihs, Page Vault & Eric Pesale, Common Ethical Issues to Consider When Researching Jurors and
Witnesses on Social Media, Above the Law (Mar. 14, 2017), http://abovethelaw.com/2017/03/common-ethical-issues-toconsider-when-researching-jurors-and-witnesses-on-social-media/citing.
119 See Zachary Mesenbourg, Voir Dire in the #LOL Society: Jury Selection Needs Drastic Updates to Remain Relevant in
the Digital Age, 47 J. Marshall L. Rev. 459 (2013) (collecting sources and noting a tension in commentary). Mesenbourg
cites one set of commentators for the premise that “lawyers cannot ignore the fact that social media affects every single
stage of the litigation process, and urges litigators to expand juror research to social sites in order to get a full and real profile
[of ] potential jury members.” Id. at 460 n.13 (citing Stephen P. Laitinen & Hilary J. Loynes, Social Media: A New “Must Use”
Tool in Litigation?, For Def., Aug. 2010, at 16). He then contrasts that premise with another commentator who wrote that
“lawyers[’] use of social media research could have an adverse effect on jurors’ perceptions of the legal process in general if
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been explicitly interpreted to apply to factual investigations. As Lauren
Kellerhouse noted in the context of searching jurors’ social media profiles,
“ [A] lawyer who, following Rule 1.1, knows the risks and benefits associated with social media, can quickly come to the conclusion that not
searching social media during voir dire may be grounds for a malpractice
claim.”120 The prudent attorney should at least consider it in serious cases,
especially high-stakes civil cases and criminal cases, to the extent that
juror information is provided to attorneys by the court.121 Kellerhouse
continues,
Therefore, as it now stands, [ABA Rule 1.1] Comment 8 does not impose
an affirmative duty to search the social media accounts of potential
jurors during voir dire. However, reasonable attorneys can recognize
the profound benefits that a simple search can bring to the process and
would be wise to start performing basic searches to meet their clients’
expectations of using technology in their representation.122

2.5. And more to come
The Duty to Google is not limited to these scenarios—they instead
represent a reflection of current caselaw, or more to the point, of the
published cases to date in which a trier of fact and/or law determined that
an attorney should have engaged in an Internet search. One can spend
hours thinking of atypical scenarios in which a particular Internet search
is required. Should an attorney probating a will Google death notices?
Should an attorney handling an immigration case target a Google search
of foreign news for information about her client? Should a labor and
employment attorney research the social media profiles of an employee
who threatens a suit? Unfortunately, absent clearer guidance, those
searching for clarity in the Duty to Google may only obtain it by reading
a “benchslap.”
What these cases all have in common is that they extended an
attorney’s duty of fact collection, and in so doing, did not point to a
specific rule, requirement, or even a guideline that Internet research was

they feel as though their privacy is invaded—which could also hinder their willingness to be an impartial participant in the
process.” Id. (citing Duncan Stark, Juror Investigation: Is In-Courtroom Internet Research Going Too Far?, 7 Wash. J.L. Tech
& Arts 93, 101 (2011)). Mesenbourg comes to the fair conclusion that like it or not, some amount of digital voir dire is
becoming (or has become) the norm. Id. at 485–86.
120 Lauren Kellerhouse, Comment 8 of Rule 1.1: The Implications of Technological Competence on Investigation, Discovery,
and Client Security, 40 J. Legal Prof. 291, 297 (2016).
121 See Lundberg, supra note 95, at 125 n.1 (“Multiple decisions have imposed some sort of obligation on attorneys to
conduct Internet research on jurors or members of the venire in order to preserve a possible claim of juror misconduct or
non-disclosure on appeal.”).
122 Kellerhouse, supra note 120, at 298.
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now warranted. What is concerning about all of them is that the attorneys
involved violated a duty to their client that they may not have known
existed until after they violated it.
It is clear from these cases that a technological revolution is changing
the way attorneys must research their work. But is the Duty to Google just
another example of how attorneys must become proficient in technology
to meet their professional ethical obligations? What kind of professional
duty is it? And when should it arise? These questions form the basis of the
next section of this article.

3. Toward a codified Duty to Google
There is ample support for, at least, enhancing Model Rule 1.1 to
more fully describe an attorney’s responsibility to maintain technological
proficiency, which could include guidance with respect to factual investigation of legal matters.123 Commentators are already calling on the ABA to
provide guidance of the contours and extent of an attorney’s duty to use
technology in practice.124 Even then, it is clear, as Heidi Frostestad Kuehl
noted, “[S]cholars and judges are still grappling with a functional definition for what would constitute competent representation within the era
of this widely expanding digital age for attorneys.”125
Attorneys worried that they are not researching enough (or at all) and
taking on risk need some sort of relief. Reliance on judicial opinions is
reactive, as described above. Knowledge of where a landmine sits is much
more useful prior to stepping on it. Attorneys could consult their state
bar for more focused guidance, but reliance on state bar ethical opinions
is misplaced. Those opinions are difficult to find and vary from state to
state.126 Also, they can lack the dependability of a baseline rule from which
deviation invites explanation,127 if they are followed at all.128

123 See Johnson, supra note 16, at 186 (“A better option for the ABA and state regulators might be to follow in the footsteps
of states like Colorado, Indiana, and New York, and edit the technology competence Comment directly. Providing additional
clarity regarding what the term ‘relevant technology’ encompasses may be seen by additional states as a method of providing
clarity to lawyers seeking to fulfill their obligations.”).
124 Katy Ho, Defining the Contours of an Ethical Duty of Technological Competence, 30 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 853 (2017).
125 Kuehl, supra note 21, at 4.
126 See Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?, 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 731, 752 (2002) (noting
variance in opinions); Lawrence K. Hellman, When Ethics Rules Don’t Mean What They Say: The Implications of Strained
ABA Ethics Opinions, 10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 317, 323–24 (1996).
127 See, e.g., Lawrence K. Hellman, A Better Way to Make State Legal Ethics Opinions, 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 973 (1997)
(discussing the problems with the current scheme of non-authoritative state ethics opinions and offering suggested reforms
and value analysis of a controlling form of ethics opinions).
128 Green, supra note 126, at 742
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What current guidance exists about the Duty to Google is in a
comment to a Model Rule. As commentators have noted, states interpret
comments to the Model Rules (and even the rules themselves) inconsistently and quite differently, making the boundaries of acceptable conduct
even more murky.129 As Peter A. Joy noted, “[E]ven jurisdictions with
an identical ethical rule often interpret and apply the rule differently.”130
Multiple states have made changes to the rule, though none have
specifically discussed an attorney’s duty of investigation.131 The current
landscape is unclear, at best. Katy Ho put it bluntly: “Attorneys cannot
fulfill their duty of competence if they do not know what it entails.”132
Elevating the Duty to Google from a comment to a clearly described
rule makes some sense. While its interpretation may still be murky, it
is clear from the Duty to Google cases thus far that some, if not many,
attorneys can use as much guidance as rulemakers can provide. Further,
the exercise in drafting such a rule would invite and advance the development of the professional norm of a “reasonable investigation.” Adopting
such a rule would also hasten the creation or enhancement of a muchneeded system of education and communication to the bar promoting
technological proficiency.
Technology has changed factual investigation, much in the same way
that it has changed essentially all of legal practice.133 It is possible that the
cases above reflect some resistance to that change.134 In fact, legal practice
seems even more resistant to adapt to technology than other industries.135
Introducing a codified rule would help reduce that resistance, which
would result in better, more affordable legal service to clients. 136 This
section proposes a rule of professional conduct that is intended to be
clear enough for lawyers to understand their ethical duties to investigate
but broad enough to encompass emerging technologies. Its purpose is
to provide a framework for an observer to appreciate the many different
129 See Johnson, supra note 16, at 173; Hellman, supra note 127, at 323–24, 975–76.
130 Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulation of Lawyers’ Conduct, 15 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 313, 330 (2002).
131 Johnson, supra note 16, at 173.
132 Ho, supra note 124, at 870.
133 See Ellie Margolis, Is the Medium the Message? Unleashing the Power of E-communication in the Twenty-First Century,
12 Legal Comm. & Rhetoric 1, 2 (2015).
134 Id.
135 See id. at 2 n.12 (borrowing the observation that “many lawyers still practice law ‘as if it were 1999’”) (quoting Nicole
Black, Lawyers, Technology and a Light at the End of the Tunnel, The Daily Record (Nov. 6, 2013),http://nylawblog.
typepad.com/suigeneris/2013/11/lawyers-technology-and-a-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-.html).
136 Ho, supra note 124, at 867 (“The ABA should take a disciplined approach to rule-making by explicitly identifying areas
in which technology amplifies concerns . . . . As a normative matter, setting explicit rules will help manage expectations and
provide a minimum standard for attorneys to meet.”).
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circumstances that may affect an attorney’s investigation of a matter using
electronic search technology, which can include the cost of the search,
resources of the client, and availability of technology. It is also intended to
be somewhat deferential to an attorney’s judgment, to compensate for an
ex post tendency to hold an attorney overly accountable for a mistake that
seems more obvious looking backward from now.
3.1. Proposal for a codified Duty to Google
A codified Duty to Google—we could call it a “Duty of Technological
Use in Investigations”—may best fit as language in a rule of professional
conduct, likely Model Rule 1.1. An example of this language might read
like the following:
Competent handling of a particular matter includes a reasonable investigation of the factual circumstances surrounding that matter, including
the competent use of common electronic search technology.

A comment to this language would provide more detail on two important
factors: the breadth and the depth of an investigation. First, the comment
would describe the breadth of an acceptable investigation:
Factual circumstances surrounding a matter will differ in each matter,
but may include facts stated in a legal filing; facts regarding a client,
witness, or adverse or third party; facts conveyed to a lawyer from the
lawyer’s client; facts upon which a lawyer’s legal opinion necessarily
relies; or facts about a potential juror.

Next, the comment would describe the depth of an acceptable investigation:
Circumstances surrounding a matter will also differ in each matter and
may differ over time during a representation. In determining the scope
of an investigation, a lawyer should take general standards of reasonableness and defensibility of decisionmaking into account. Factors used
in determining the “reasonableness” of a fact investigation include:
(a) the issues and/or amount at stake in the matter; (b) the resources
available to the attorney, including where applicable, the resources of the
client; (c) the availability of and cost to locate the overlooked information
at the time of the search.137 Reasonableness should also (d) account for
137 This standard may be similar to the reasonableness standard for a factual inquiry with respect to disclosures made in
discovery. See Patrick Oot, Anne Kershaw & Herbert Roitblat, Mandating Reasonableness in a Reasonable Inquiry, 87 Denv.
U. L. Rev. 533, 542 (2010) (quoting a judge’s discovery ruling that when challenging a reasonable inquiry, counsel should
consider “(1) the number and complexity of the issues; (2) the location, nature, number and availability of potentially relevant
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the availability, cost, and adoption of new search technologies.138 Lastly,
the reasonable standard should take into account the lawyer’s professional judgment in evaluating the results of the lawyer’s search, including
evaluating the reliability of the sources of search results.

Certain specific phrases are discussed below.
3.1.1. “Competent handling of a particular matter includes”

This phrase intends to bring the new language in line with the existing
framework of competent representation, as seen in Model Rule 1.1. This
additional language should be considered a clarification of the parameters
of the existing duty to investigate, and not a new duty. This additional
language is more direct and provides more guidance than the current
regime, which requires attorneys to take a general duty of competence
and apply it to a duty to keep up with technology. It provides a framework
for an attorney to use in creating a process for factual investigation, and a
basis for defending the choices made as to the extent of that investigation.
3.1.2. “A reasonable investigation of the factual circumstances
surrounding that matter”

“Reasonable” is the word doing the most work here. The duty to investigate has conceptual limits and should be proportional to a reasonable
degree. An attorney must consider when searching for information about
a matter ceases to be a benefit—at that point, the attorney should stop.
In the capital case context, the Supreme Court has noted that attorneys
need not “scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up” and
that “reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good
reason to think further investigation would be a waste.”139 However, the
lesson from the cases described in section 2 is that an attorney must make
some sort of Internet search, and critically, the attorney must successfully
locate important information.140 There is an allure to simply relying on the
comfortable language requiring an “inquiry into and analysis of the factual
and legal elements of the problem and the use of methods and procedures
meeting the standards of competent practitioners.”141 But this is an ex post
requirement; to satisfy the duty the attorney must find the golden nugget of
witnesses or documents; (3) the extent of past working relationships between the attorney and the client, particularly in
related or similar litigation; and (4) the time available to conduct an investigation”).
138 Accordingly, lawyers would not be required to be “early adopters” of advanced search technology under most circumstances, but would be required to stay reasonably current with widely-adopted technology.
139 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005).
140 See Anna Massoglia, The Voodoo and How-To of Lawyers’ Duty to Search the Internet, Lawyerist.com (Aug. 8, 2016),
https://lawyerist.com/104698/voodoo-howto-lawyers-duty-search-internet/.
141 Model R. Prof’l Conduct 1.1 cmt. 5.
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information. To fail to find the nugget is to violate the duty.142 If no nugget
exists, no searching is required. Strickland v. Washington provides an
example. There, the Court noted that “choices made after less than complete
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.”143
This phenomenon has been examined in the legal research context.
Ellie Margolis noted that when judges sanction attorneys for inadequate
searches of legal authority, they do so mainly “based on the perception
that the authority should have been known, or could have been easily
found through basic research techniques known to all lawyers. Many
courts judge the reasonableness of the research by the sufficiency of the
argument, rather than looking at the research itself.”144
George Cohen described the extent of the duty to investigate as wide,
but not unlimited, and subject to reasonableness:
It is true that any duty to investigate that the lawyer owes to the client
under the Model Rules is not boundless. The duty to investigate is
subject to a reasonableness requirement. Thus, a lawyer must calculate
whether the likely value of the investigation exceeds the costs. The scope
of the duty to investigate can also be limited by the nature and duration
of the representation, as well as by specific agreements between the
client and the lawyer concerning the scope of the representation or the
type of advice sought.145

Also, Cohen has noted that statutes or guidelines requiring that an
attorney have actual knowledge of a certain fact—for instance, whether
their client has skipped bail—do not necessarily require an investigation,
even if a reasonable attorney might suspect that fact to be true. 146 As
Cohen put it, “Most duties to investigate . . . are created by substantive
rules, not by the scienter standard.” 147 Further, the Strickland Court
allowed for instances in which an attorney may rely on a client’s statements
with respect to reasonably limiting an investigation, noting that “when a
defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue
those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.”148
142 See Ho, supra note 124, at 868 (“What happens if an attorney mistakenly uses a new technology and gets sanctioned—
what additional steps should she have taken to avoid a breach in her ethical duty of technological competence?”).
143 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
144 Margolis, supra note 133, at 99.
145 Cohen, supra note 33, at 128.
146 See id. at 125–26.
147 Id. at 126.
148 466 U.S. at 691.
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Evaluating that judgment will be fact-specific and should be viewed
under a reasonableness standard.149 Some parallels exist and perhaps
some guidance can be found in courts’ application of the standard for
effectiveness of counsel as it relates to an attorney’s duty to investigate
facts in a criminal case, adopting the language from Rompilla v. Beard that
“reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason
to think further investigation would be a waste.”150 For example, is a result
on the second or third page of search engine results so obviously available
that the failure to notice it is sanctionable?151 This question is likely to be
fact specific. It bears noting for any reasonableness determination that
95% of Google searchers never make it to the second page of results.152
Looking back from an ex post approach has its dangers. It is important
that judges avoid the approach in which the value of the overlooked information affects the evaluation.153 A judge should instead focus on the cost
of locating that information. For example, if a free Google search would
not have located the information that the attorney missed, but a professional search firm would have found that information, the cost of the
search firm should be a factor in determining reasonableness.
In judging where a proper amount of Internet searching occurred, a
ruling authority should be very careful to remember that timing is also
an issue.154 Internet searches are ephemeral—taking judicial notice of an
Internet search that the judge makes during the case creates a temporal
problem.155 A reality of the Internet is that content comes and goes in a
literal instant, and many links—perhaps even the ones in the footnotes

149 See Margolis, supra note 133, at 102 (examining the use of the Internet in determining the sufficiency of legal research
and noting that “[s]ince the court measures reasonableness by considering what other attorneys in a similar position would
do, it follows that the research techniques employed by the majority of lawyers are those that are standard in practice, and
thus set the bar for reasonableness”).
150 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005).
151 See Jessica Lee, No. 1 Position in Google Gets 33% of Search Traffic, Search Engine Watch (June 20, 2013), https://
searchenginewatch.com/sew/study/2276184/no-1-position-in-google-gets-33-of-search-traffic-study.
152 Id.
153 This may cause some tension to the extent that a judge views a Duty to Google sanction in the same vein as a discovery
sanction. Discovery sanctions in particular can require a court to examine the importance of the information in question.
See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1) (requiring that a court considering discovery sanctions for spoliation of evidence weigh the
“prejudice to another party” of the loss of evidence, which necessarily requires an examination of that evidence’s importance
to the party); Cunningham v. Hamilton Cty., 527 U.S. 198, 205 (1999) (stating that in discovery, “[a]n evaluation of the appropriateness of sanctions may require the reviewing court to inquire into the importance of the information sought or the
adequacy or truthfulness of a response”).
154 See Jill Lepore, Can the Internet Be Archived?, The New Yorker (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2015/01/26/cobweb.
155 Id. (noting that “[t]he average life of a Web page is about a hundred days” and that “[t]he Web dwells in a never-ending
present. It is—elementally—ethereal, ephemeral, unstable, and unreliable.”). Link rot is a serious issue, especially for judicial
opinions. One article notes that over a third of citations to the Internet in published appellate court opinions in Kentucky
between June 2011 and July 2017 no longer worked. See Michael Whiteman & Jennifer Frazier, Internet Citations in Appellate
Court Opinions: Something’s Still Rotting in the Commonwealth, 82 Bench & B., July/Aug. 2018, at 20, 21.
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of this article156—will disappear over time, a phenomenon known as “link
rot.”157 Attorneys should be judged by the information available in such a
search at the time they should have made it. A judge performing a proper
search during the case is searching later—often much later—in time, and
the judge’s search results in the present will likely be different than the
attorney’s results in the past.
A different sort of availability issue exists with social media information. Most social media platforms have privacy settings that allow
their users to control public access to any content that the users post.158
Social media users can, usually, change those settings at any time. So
information on, for example, a juror’s bias that is seemingly available upon
review today may not have been available at the time of voir dire. Practically, there is little way to determine the availability of such information
in the past, without discovery into the history of the privacy settings of
the juror’s social media account.
“A reasonable investigation of the factual circumstances surrounding
that matter” is also intended to account for the flexibility in “factual
circumstances” specific to each matter, with the commentary fleshing
out some examples. “Surrounding that matter” is also intended to be
extremely broad.
3.1.3. “Including the competent use”

This language intentionally carries with it a professional responsibility for information literacy. It requires an attorney to evaluate sources
in a more advanced way than a pre-Internet search comprising a check
of a limited number of vetted information sources. Internet search
engines tend to rank results by popularity, not veracity, and display unreliable information next to reliable information.159 It is easy to confuse a
misleading source with an “institutional depository of information.”160

156 As much as it pains the author of this article to note.
157 See Coleen M. Barger, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Judge: Appellate Courts’ Use of Internet Materials, 4
J. App. Prac. & Process 417, 438 (2002). Professor Barger points out the ironic observation of law librarian Mary
Rumsey, author of a study about link rot, that “authors who cite Web sites instead of paper sources probably think they are
making their sources more available to readers, rather than less.” Id. (quoting Mary Rumsey, Runaway Train: Problems of
Permanence, Accessibility, and Stability in the Use of Web Sources in Law Review Citations, 94 L. Lib. J. 27, 34 (2002)).
158 For example, on Facebook, a user can choose an “audience” for each piece of account information or content—and can
choose between making that content essentially unpublished, only available to the user’s Facebook “friends,” or available to
the general public. See Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/help/325807937506242 (last
visited Feb. 20, 2021).
159 Baker, supra note 4, at 570 (observing that “information retrieval is generally now reliant upon algorithms to provide
‘relevant’ results. The list of relevant results provided with relative ease is an absolute benefit of using algorithms in law. It
allows for great efficiency, which equates to greater access to justice. However, the problem is how competent it all looks,
enticing lawyers to blindly rely on the results.”).
160 Barger, supra note 157, at 422.
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As Michael Whiteman has noted, “The ease of using Google can lull an
attorney into a false sense of security, but attorneys should be cautious
because ‘search engine returns are incomplete for research purposes.’”161
It should also be clear that the attorney’s judgment is subject to the duty,
and not the search algorithm’s effectiveness.162 This relationship between
attorney and algorithm has been aptly described as the attorney acting as
an “information fiduciary.”163 Jamie J. Baker, who first adapted the term to
attorneys, concludes that “competent lawyers must understand the information they rely on and provide advice to a client that is the result of the
lawyer’s independent, educated judgment.”164 In this way the attorney’s duty
to interpret search results does not differ much from the attorney’s interpretation of, for example, due diligence research or a form contract.
It is possible to fashion criteria for evaluating an Internet source, of
course. Collen Barger has suggested that a critical Internet researcher
should examine “a site’s completeness, along with its author and publisher,
source of data, language, accuracy, currency, coverage, archiving, workability, stability, user interactivity, cost, and licensing.”165 Technological
proficiency is, once again, essential to the reasonableness of the attorney’s
judgment in interpreting search results. Lauren Kellerhouse notes
that attorneys perform a similar task in interpreting search results in
predictive coding searches in discovery, where attorneys must understand
the technology to make sure it has worked correctly.166 Kellerhouse notes
that this technical proficiency is in harmony with comment 8’s charge that
the attorney should “keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice,
including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”167
Attorneys must then understand search technology enough to critically
evaluate its results.
3.1.4. “Of common electronic search technology”

This specific language is intentionally broad. Jamie Baker notes that
the Model Rules with respect to technological competence are drafted as
161 Whiteman, supra note 53, at 46.
162 Baker, supra note 4, at 574 (noting that “a lawyer, at a minimum, must be aware of the issues surrounding the use of
algorithms and use reasonable care”).
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Barger, supra note 157, at 426 n.24 (citing Mirela Roznovschi, Evaluating Foreign and International Legal Databases
on the Internet, LLRX (Feb. 1, 1999), https://www.llrx.com/1999/02/features-evaluating-foreign-and-international-legaldatabases-on-the-internet/).
166 Kellerhouse, supra note 120, at 298–300. Predictive coding is a method of machine-aided document review by which a
computer algorithm and “machine learning” assist a reviewer in locating relevant information in a set of electronically stored
information. Id. at 298.
167 Id. at 299 (quoting Model R. of Prof’l Conduct 1.1 cmt. 8).
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“purposefully broad,” such that they can address “technologies that have
not yet been conceived.”168 However, the guidance thus far published
about these rules has been extremely narrow, focusing mainly on data
security. 169 So while these rules can adjust to new technologies with
respect to Internet searching, absent specificity in the rules, attorneys are
on their own to extrapolate the rules to new technologies.170 Indeed, there
is some support for intentional flexibility in the rules and guidelines with
respect to technological competence because technological innovation
will invariably move faster than those rules and guidelines.171
Most of this article assumes that Google is the first, best, and
last piece of technology to provide for an increased ability to conduct
factual investigation into a legal matter. That is, of course, shortsighted.
Somewhere in the world an entrepreneur is developing a piece of technology that will become as widely used as Google, and will affect many
aspects of life, including factual investigations. At what point does that
technology become the next “Google,” in other words, “common” technology, and thus part of the “Duty to Google”?
Some parallels can again be found in the development of electronic
legal research. In one of the first, but still very relevant, discussions of
how access to the Internet changed legal research, Michael Whiteman
discussed the question about what standard an attorney should follow in
conducting legal research.172 To do so, Whiteman cited a standard from a
California Supreme Court case, Smith v. Lewis, 173 where the Court wrote,
As the jury was correctly instructed, an attorney does not ordinarily
guarantee the soundness of his opinions and, accordingly, is not liable
for every mistake he may make in his practice. He is expected, however,
to possess knowledge of those plain and elementary principles of law
which are commonly known by well informed attorneys, and to discover
those additional rules of law which, although not commonly known, may
readily be found by standard research techniques.174

Whiteman concludes, “Unless it can be shown that the use of electronic sources in legal research has become a standard technique, then
168 Johnson, supra note 16, at 170 (quoting Baker, supra note 4, at 557).
169 See id.
170 See id. (noting that “state regulators enacting and enforcing the Comment, as well as scholars who have discussed it,
have instead provided narrow, prescriptive guidance and enforcement”).
171 See id. at 189.
172 Michael Whiteman, The Impact of the Internet and Other Electronic Sources on an Attorney’s Duty of Competence Under
the Rules of Professional Conduct, 11 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 89, 91 (2000).
173 530 P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975).
174 Whiteman, supra note 172, at 91 (quoting Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975)).
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lawyers who fail to use electronic sources will not be deemed unethical
or negligent in his or her failure to use such tools.”175 He points to the
following factors to determine whether the use of an electronic source is a
“standard technique”: the level of adoption and whether attorneys charge
for its use.176
Ellie Margolis chronicled the evolution of electronic legal research
technology, noting where a tool made the key jump from “luxury” to
“necessity.”177 Specifically, Margolis pointed to Shepardizing as an example
of a technology that is so ubiquitous in legal practice as to be required
for an attorney’s legal research work to be competent.178 She notes that
certain factors contributed to the “expectation” that a technology would
be used for competent legal research: (a) its widespread use among
attorneys in legal representation, (b) its inclusion as a billed service passed
on by attorneys to clients, (c) its adoption as part of a practical curriculum
in law schools, and (d) its essentialness in accessing certain sources of
information.179
3.2. Application of the Duty to Google
Following a Duty to Google may compel attorneys to handle the
intake and management of matters a little differently. As a matter of best
practices, absent an explicit rule, attorneys should carefully document
their Internet searches and results. They should consider drafting a
memo to file describing their interpretation of the results, along with
any potential follow-up research or tasks. Importantly, attorneys should
recognize at the time that the memorialization of this process cuts into
the very time- and money-saving benefits of the electronic search, and
document their decision to discontinue a line of investigation.
To that end, an attorney has to build this additional fact investigation
into the cost of representation. After all, attorneys often bill by the hour and
while Internet searches take milliseconds, scrolling through search results,
reading, digesting, and following up on those results can take some time. Is
an attorney’s investigation now more expensive, because more information
is available, even though relevant information is much easier to locate?180

175 Id.
176 See id. at 91–102.
177 Margolis, supra note 35, at 119.
178 Id. at 92. Indeed, it is notable that “Shepardizing,” like “Googling,” is a proper noun that has become ubiquitous.
179 See generally id. at 107–10.
180 That technology would reduce time to perform a task but nevertheless increase cost in litigation has for years been the
reality in litigation discovery. See generally Rebecca Simmons, Monica Lerma & Steve S. McNew, Discovery in 2016: New
Rules, Cases and Technology, 74 Advoc. (Tex.) 61 (2016).
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Given these cost considerations, it may be appropriate for an attorney in
many instances to delegate the required investigation duty to a paralegal or
support staff. But in which instances? The line is certainly not clear; however
it is common and ethically proper for attorneys to delegate their professional
responsibilities, under supervision.181 That being said, the higher the stakes
and the more potentially important the information, the more the attorney
will want to be involved in the Internet search and analysis.
The existence of the attorney’s rationale for interpreting search
results will provide a factfinder with the ability to evaluate the attorney’s
judgment at the time, rather than in a backwards-looking manner. In the
capital case context, the Supreme Court in Wiggins v. Smith182 made a
telling distinction in finding an inadequate investigation by concluding,
“The record of the actual sentencing proceedings underscores the unreasonableness of counsel’s conduct by suggesting that their failure to
investigate thoroughly resulted from inattention, not reasoned strategic
judgment.”183 Attorneys should be ready to evidence their judgment in
setting the scope of an investigation, including their use (or lack of use) of
available search technology.
Should an attorney Google each and every client, every matter? It is
hard to say. There do not appear to be any recent cases holding that even
though the attorney didn’t perform an Internet search, the attorney’s investigation was nonetheless sufficient. An attorney handling a routine matter
for a longstanding client may not need to Google the matter, for example.
It seems likely that in most matters of any size, some measure of
Googling is required. Even a cursory Google search seems prudent in
almost every circumstance. Think about that for a moment. In a little
more than a generation, an attorney’s duty to investigate has grown to the
point where, at the absolute minimum, the attorney needs Internet access
and the ability to make a reasonably skilled Internet search.184
The reasonableness of frequency and intensity of searches should
depend on the issues and resources available. Attorneys would be well
advised to set up automatic “alerts” for certain keywords involving
important clients or matters, so that they are automatically notified of
potentially important new Internet content.185
181 See R. Thomas Howell Jr. & Eric G. Orlinsky, What Paralegals Can Do: And the List Goes on, 16 Bus. L. Today 17
(2007).
182 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
183 Id. at 526.
184 See Margolis, supra note 35, at 110 (referencing the “Google Generation” of young attorneys who grew up using the
world wide web constantly to learn about the world).
185 For example, Google offers free Google Alerts, in which a user can have a daily, weekly or monthly email sent to them
collecting new articles that meet user-defined keywords. See, e.g., Google Alerts, Google, https://www.google.com/alerts
(last visited May 12, 2021).
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Conclusion: Looking ahead
The bar and legal academia should incorporate Internet fact-finding
into basic legal training and continuing legal education.186 Several CLEs
exist to teach attorneys how to conduct effective Internet searches,187 but
they tend to focus on building on a core competency that each attorney
possesses. It is likely that many attorneys can benefit from fine-tuning
their search skills, but it may be more impactful for more CLEs to focus
on basic electronic search skills. Attorney technological competency is
famously poor, despite such competency being an ethical requirement.188
There are anecdotal and empirical examples of skilled attorneys who lack
technological competency.189 It may take an outreach program to educate
the bar to bring its overall competency up to the appropriate level—if that
level is discernible. This outreach program would incorporate basic skills
for attorneys who need them but would feature recent technology, helping
attorneys “keep up with the times.” Further, as Ellie Margolis pointed out,
advances in technology raise standards for competency, meaning that the
expectations judges and clients have for attorney fact investigation are
now higher (and will increase).190
In the future, it is not difficult to see more state bar associations
requiring technology CLE credit in the same specialized way that they
require ethics CLE credit, and even to see law schools offer technological
competency courses.191 While practicing attorneys reading this paragraph
may have audibly groaned at yet another licensure requirement, closing
the “technology gap” is a worthwhile enterprise. Attorneys who lack basic
skills and resist innovation would be at least exposed to the technology

186 See Browning, supra note 12, at 196 (“But as a practical matter, how do we go about achieving the goal of technological
competence? The key is education.”).
187 See, e.g., CLE Webinar Covers Ethics of Social Media Research, Internet for Lawyers (June 2020), https://www.
netforlawyers.com/content/social-media-research-ethics-mcle-0227; Google-Based Legal Research for Lawyers (On
Demand), LawPractice CLE (Nov. 4, 2020), https://lawpracticecle.com/courses/google-based-legal-research-for-lawyerson-demand/.
188 Britton, supra note 20, at 34 (“Even back in the 19th century, lawyers were failing to adopt the newest technology—the
telephone. In 1891, 7,000 businesses in the New York/New Jersey area had telephones. Among those, there were 937 doctors,
363 saloons, 315 stables, and last were 146 lawyers. Lawyers’ biggest technological challenge, then, has nothing to do with
a specific technology; the hesitation and reticence with which they adopt any technology is the primary obstacle they must
overcome.”).
189 Michael E. McCabe Jr., What They Didn’t Teach in Law School: The Ethical Duty of “Technical Competence,” McCabe IP
Ethics Law Blog (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.ipethicslaw.com/what-they-didnt-teach-in-law-school-the-ethical-duty-oftechnical-competence/ (describing a colleague, a talented patent lawyer who never used a computer, and urging attorneys to
take CLEs to become technologically competent).
190 Margolis, supra note 35, at 111.
191 See Browning, supra note 12, at 196. Indeed, as Browning notes, Suffolk University Law School offers a six-course Legal
Innovations and Technology Certificate designed for practicing attorneys. Id.
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they should be using, and more technologically savvy attorneys would
have a good reason to stay current.
It is clear that attorneys have a requirement to perform an Internet
search about prospective (and current) clients, witnesses, potential matters,
and in certain cases, potential jurors. It is less clear where that requirement
extends to other areas of legal representation and troubling that those areas
may only be discovered after an attorney faces sanctions. Reliance on ethical
opinions from state bar journals to avoid these sanctions is not enough. For
guidance’s sake, it makes sense to codify this requirement as part of the
rules governing an attorney’s professional responsibility. Drafters of such
a rule face a real challenge of scope and depth as they search for the right
balance between expectation and fairness. Greater detail with respect to
an attorney’s technological competence will help the bar stop searching for
answers about its Duty to Google.

